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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Until such time as a new set of rules or statutes is adopted, how-
ever, the situation with respect to contribution pleading practice
appears to be as follows:
(1) where the plaintiff sues some but not all of the joint
tort-feasors, an original defendant may have the others joined
upon a plea for contribution against them ;29
(2) where the plaintiff sues all of the joint tort-feasors,
but one or more successfully demurs to the complaint and the
plaintiff fails to amend or appeal, the remaining defendants,
assuming they have adequate time, may have the defendants,
who were dismissed on demurrer, brought back into the action
upon a plea for contribution ;30
(3) where the plaintiff sues all of the joint tort-feasors,
even though plaintiff takes a voluntary, or suffers an involun-
tary nonsuit as to one of them, the remaining defendants can-
not preclude his dismissal by pleading a cross-claim for con-
tribution, but are relegated to a separate action in order to
settle the issue of contribution."1
HIRAM A. BERRY
Torts-Blasting-Basis of Liability: Negligence, Trespass or Absolute
Liability
No less than twenty-five years have elapsed since the problem
of damages caused by blasting operations has reached the North
Carolina Supreme Court. During this period, however, much liti-
gation has arisen in this area of tort law elsewhere in the country,
and a reasonable prediction would be that the next case in North
Carolina will result in a new development in the law of this state.
The prime question facing the courts in this field concerns the
proper basis of liability for harm occasioned by the use of explosives
in blasting. Theoretically, there are three theories open to those
courts which remain uncommitted on this issue. They are: (1)
recovery should always depend upon proof of negligence or fault;
(2) the action should be one of trespass following the common law
concept of strict liability for trespass to land; and (3) the defendant
9Norris v. Johnson, 246 N.C. 179, 97 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
0 Yandell v. National Fireproofing Corp., 239 N.C. 1, 79 S.E.2d 223
(1953); Canestrino v. Powell, 231 N.C. 190, 56 S.E.2d 566 (1949).
"' Bass v. Lee, 255 N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d 570 (1961) ; Greene v. Charlotte
Chem. Labs., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961).
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should be absolutely liable on the ground that public policy demands
that he stand as an insurer of any injury resulting from the operation
of an extrahazardous activity.
As a practical matter, it is generally agreed that an action of
trespass may be maintained where rocks and debris are thrown upon
the plaintiff's land' or against his person ' by blasting. The majority
of jurisdictions,3 recently joined by South Carolina4 and West Vir-
ginia,5 also impose liability, irrespective of negligence, when the
plaintiff's domain is damaged by concussion waves and ground
vibrations.6 A minority of states,7 however, require proof of negli-
'E.g., Asheville Constr. Co. v. Southern Ry., 19 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1927);
Adams & Sullivan v. Sengel, 177 Ky. 535, 197 S.W. 974 (1917); Hay v.
Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849). Contra, requiring proof of negligence,
Bennett v. Texas-Illinois Gas Pipeline Co., 113 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Ark.
1953); Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P.2d 862 (1934);
Thompson v. Green Mountain Power Corp., 120 Vt. 478, 144 A.2d 786
(1958).
'E.g., Welz v. Manzillo, 113 Conn. 674, 155 Atl. 841 (1931); Sullivan
v. Dunham, 161 N.Y. 290, 55 N.E. 923 (1900); Wells v. Knight, 32 R.I.
432, 80 Atl. 16 (1911). Contra, requiring negligence, Klepsch v. Donald,
4 Wash. 436, 30 Pac. 991 (1892).
'California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
'Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960),
discussed in Note, 10 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 98 (1961). In the only other
blasting case in South Carolina, the court found sufficient evidence of negli-
gence to carry the case to the jury. Harris v. Simon, 32 S.C. 593, 10 S.E.
1076 (1890). In a later case involving vibration damage caused by pile
driving, the court said the Harris case apparently required proof of negli-
gence in the blasting cases. Momeier v. Koebig, 220 S.C. 124, 129, 66
S.E.2d 465, 467 (1951). The court in Wallace said that since the sole con-
cern of the Harris appeal was the sufficiency of negligence, the case was dis-
tinguishable, no negligence being alleged here, and dismissed the reference
to the Harris rule in the Momeier decision as dictum. 237 S.C. at 355, 117
S.E.2d at 361-62.
'Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corp., 118 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va.
1961). Adoption of the rule of absolute liability by the West Virginia court
was largely predetermined by two federal decisions. Fairfax Inn, Inc. v.
Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. W. Va. 1951); Britton v.
Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); and earlier
state cases containing strong undertones of strict liability. Wigal v. City
of Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S.E. 554 (1914) ; Weaver Mercantile Co.
v. Thurmond, 68 W. Va. 530, 70 S.E. 126 (1911).
'E.g., Fairfax Inn, Inc. v. Sunnyhill Mining Co., supra note 5; Garden
of the Gods Village v. Hellman, 133 Colo. 286, 294 P.2d 597 (1956) ; Central
Exploration Co. v. Gray, 219 Miss. 757, 70 So. 2d 33 (1954); Thigpen v.
Skousen & Hise, 64 N.M. -290, 327 P.2d 802 (1958). " See generally Annot.,
20 A.L.R.2d 1372 (1951); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §§ 519-20 (1938).
'Alabama, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Texas.
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gence8 in the latter situation unless a nuisance is shown.'
Courts imposing absolute liability rely upon one or all of the
following theories: (1) air waves or ground vibrations constitute
trespass;1O (2) one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity must
be held absolutely responsible because of the possibility of risk;"
(3) one must not use his property so as to injure that of another ;12
(4) these cases fall within the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher; or (5)
8E.g., Ledbetter-Johnson v. Hawkins, 267 Ala. 458, 103 So. 2d 748
(1958); Cratty v. Samuel Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 116 A.2d 623 (1955);
Dalton v. Demos Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 334 Mass. 377, 135 N.E.2d
646 (1956); Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E.
592 (1893).
'Central Iron & Coal Co. v. Vandenheuk, 147 Ala. 546, 41 So. 145
(1906) (rock quarry); Benton v. Kerman, 127 N.J. Eq. 434, 13 A.2d 825
(Ct. Ch. 1940) (rock quarry); Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293
N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944) (rock quarry), rehearing denied, 294 N.Y.
654, 60 N.E.2d 385 (1945).
"0 "One [vibration or concussion] is as much a trespass as the other [rock
or debris]." Whitney v. Ralph Myers Contracting Corp., 118 S.E.2d 622,
626 (W. Va. 1961). See also Johnson v. Kansas City Terminal R.R., 182
Mo. App. 349, 170 S.W. 456 (1914); Hickey v. McCabe & Bihler, 30 R.I.
346, 75 Atl. 404 (1910).
" The theory is that by engaging in the ultrahazardous activity, the de-
fendant necessarily exposes others to danger. A possibility of risk arises
from the dangerous character of the enterprise, which the defendant should
assume because he has introduced it into the community. Fairfax Inn, Inc. v.
Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 (N.D. W. Va. 1951); Britton v.
Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Whitman Hotel
Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'r Co., 137 Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951).
It should be noted, however, that the risk here is not necessarily an unrea-
sonable one giving rise to a likelihood or probability of injury, i.e., negli-
gence. The reasonably prudent man would proceed with the blasting, but
stand as an insurer of any consequences resulting from its dangerous nature.
EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT § 15 (1951); ELDREDGE, MOD-
ERN TORT PROBLEMS 40 (1941); 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 14.7 (1956);
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 154 (1881); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 520(a),
comment a (1938).
The above cases further state the generally accepted idea that even abso-
lute liability must be based upon some foreseeability of harm. See RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS §519 (1938). This foreseeability qualification to absolute
liability led Dean Prosser to conclude that the better rule would be to impose
absolute liability in urban or densely populated areas and require proof of
negligence in rural or relatively uninhabited localities. PROSSER, TORTS § 59
(2d ed. 1955). This is apparently the law in California. See Alonso v. Hills,
95 Cal. App. 2d 778, 214 P.2d 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950). Several other cases
have also discussed this dual concept. See particularly Boonville Collieries
Corp. v. Reynolds, 163 N.E. 627 (Ind. App. Ct. 1960) (reversing judgment
for failure to allege nature of surroundings).
" McGrath v. Basich Bros. Constr. Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 573, 46 P.2d 981
(Dist. Ct. App. 1935): Louden v. City of Cincinnati, 90 Ohio St. 144, 106
N.E. 970 (1914); Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d
359 (1960). See also BIGELOW, TORTS 466 (8th ed. 1907); Annot., 20
A.L.R.2d 1372, 1374 (1951).
"'We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own
[Vol. 40
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a nuisance is found.'4
The minority of jurisdictions reply that (1) concussion or vibra-
tion damage is merely consequential, less than a physical invasion
of the plaintiff's premises, and therefore the action is properly and
historically one of trespass on the case as opposed to trespass; 15
(2) one has a right to the fullest reasonable use of his property, and
blasting is a lawful and reasonable use;16 and (3) public policy de-
mands proof of negligence.'
7
It should be manifest that this distinction drawn between rock-
debris and concussion-vibration damage is unsound and that the
basis of liability should not turn upon the form of the force pro-
ducing the injury. Both emanate from the same source and often-
times damage caused by sudden vacuums in the air or waves through
the earth is much greater than that resulting from rocks passing
purposes brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do
so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural conse-
quence of its escape .... ." Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 (1866),
af'd, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339-40 (1868). The rule has
been applied to the explosion of stored combustibles. Exner v. Sherman
Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St.
Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 60 Ohio St. 560, 54 N.E. 528 (1899); and to
blasting. Miles v. Forest Rock Granite Co., 34 L.T.R. 500 (K.B. 1918);
Britton v. Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. W. Va. 1948);
Colton v. Onderdonk, 69 Cal. 155, 10 Pac. 395 (1886). See PROSSER, The
Principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, in SErEcTED Topics ON THE LAw OF TORTS
135 (1953).
14 E.g., Longtin v. Persell, 30 Mont. 306, 76 Pac. 699 (1904) ; Beecher v.
Dull, 294 Pa. 17, 143 Ad. 498 (1928); Gossett v. Southern Ry., 115 Tenn.
376, 89 S.W. 737 (1905).
- E.g., Ledbetter-Johnson v. Hawkins, 267 Ala. 458, 103 So. 2d 748
(1958); Dalton v. Demos Bros. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 334 Mass. 377, 135
N.E.2d 646 (1956); Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., 140 N.Y. 267,
35 N.E. 592 (1893). Contra, Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d
510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'r
Co., 137 Conn. 562, 570, 79 A.2d 591, 595 (1951): "The old technical rules of
common-law pleading with their finespun distinctions between forms of
action no longer obtain." See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 14.7 (1956) ;
PROSSEa, TORTS § 59 (2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 158, comment h
(1938).
"6Reynolds v. W. H. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343, 75 A.2d 802 (1950);
Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., supra note 15. The absolute lia-
bility decisions agree with this proposition, but require one who carries on
such activities to assume the risk of all consequences resulting therefrom.
"'E.g., Booth v. Rome, W. & 0. Terminal R.R., 140 N.Y. 267, 35 N.E.
592 (1893), reasoning that the rule of strict liability impedes the development
and improvement of property. Contra, Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott &
Watrous Eng'r Co., 137 Conn. 562, 569, 79 A.2d 591, 595 (1951): "Con-
siderations of public policy do not require immunity from liability for dam-
ages caused by concussion or vibration any more than from liability for
damages caused by flying debris."
1962]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
through the plaintiff's roof. As the absolute liability decisions often
state, the distinction is nothing more than a holdover of the dif-
ference recognized at common law between the actions of trespass
and trespass on the case although forms of action are now abolished
under modem code pleading."8
Although the blasting problem has arisen in North Carolina no
less than a dozen times, 9 beginning with Blackwell v. Lynchburg
& D. R.R.2 ° seventy years ago, the court has never explicitly said
that proof of negligence is essential to recovery or that the theory
of absolute liability is unavailable.21 It is true that in the prior/
• See note 15 supra.
Sparks v. Tennessee Mineral Products Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 193 S.E.
31 (1937) ; Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., 190 N.C. 632, 130 S.E. 739 (1925) ;
Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 175 N.C. 130, 95 S.E. 92 (1918) ; Wiggins
v. Hiawassee Valley Ry., 171 N.C. 773, 89 S.E. 18 (1916); Arthur v.
Henry, 157 N.C. 438, 73 S.E. 211 (1911); Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393,
73 S.E. 206 (1911); Hunter v. Southern Ry., 152 N.C. 682, 68 S.E. 237
(1910) ; Settle v. Southern Ry., 150 N.C. 643, 64 S.E. 759 (1909) ; Kimberly
v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 55 S.E. 778 (1906) ; Watkins v. Kaolin Mfg. Co.,
131 N.C. 536, 42 S.E. 983 (1902); Gates v. Latta, 117 N.C. 189, 23 S.E.
173 (1895).
I° I N.C. 151, 16 S.E. 12 (1892). Plaintiff's intestate, who had granted
an easement to defendant railroad, was struck and killed by a flying rock while
standing in his yard some distance from where defendant contractors were
blasting. The court affirmed a judgment for plaintiff, holding the contractors
negligent in failing to cover the blast or to give timely notice thereof. Other
cases have required a showing of negligence where blasting is conducted
on an easement granted by plaintiff on the theory that he is compensated
for all reasonable, necessary and natural incidents of the work contemplated
when he accepts the consideration. This acceptance bars his right to pro-
ceed in trespass. Gordon v. Elmore, 71 W. Va. 195, 76 S.E. 344 (1912);
Watts v. Norfolk & W. R.R., 39 W. Va. 196, 19 S.E. 521 (1894). The
North Carolina court in Blackwell said: "[T]he prudent use of such an
agency [blasting] ... is always deemed to have been in contemplation when
the damage was assessed for the right of way, as a necessity incident to the
rivilege. But where damage is done to the land of the owner adjacent to
hat within the condemned boundary, if it result from managing or handling
explosive material carelessly or unskillfully . . . the corporation is answerable
in a new action.... We do not think that the privilege of throwing stones
through the air two hundred or more yards and beyond the right of way...
passes . . . as a necessary incident to the easement." 111 N.C. at 153-55,
16 S.E. at 14-15. (Emphasis added.) Although the court did not expressly
say that an action in trespass could not be maintained, it seems clear from
the above that after the condemnation proceeding the defendant could only
be held answerable on a charge of negligence. The Blackwell case has been
repeatedly cited in later decisions, none of which involved easements, as
supporting the requirement of negligence. The distinction, once laid down,
was apparently overlooked in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Sparks v. Tennessee
Mineral Products Corp., 212 N.C. 211, 193 S.E. 31 (1937). See also lan-
guage in Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393, 73 S.E. 206 (1911), which implies
that if plaintiff had not consented to the use of a quarry, he might have
proceeded in trespass.
" There is no statute directly in point, but N.C. GEr. STAT. § 14-284.1
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cases involving damage caused by rock and debris22 as well as in the
single opinion dealing with concussion and vibration,2" the court,
without exception,24 has proceeded upon negligence.25 The explana-
tion apparently lies in the fact that the court simply followed the
theory of plaintiffs' pleadings and proof. It would be refreshing
to see the next plaintiff's attorney phrase his complaint in terms of
absolute liability, or at least plead in the alternative with negligence,
and put it to the test of demurrer or a motion to strike.
In projecting upon the possibility that North Carolina will join
the majority of states applying absolute liability to all blasting, it will
be seen that the court has already taken a preliminary step in this
direction. Because of the dangerous character of the enterprise, one
who desires to carry on blasting activities may not escape liability
through an independent contractor26 or, as held in one case, a lessee.
It has also been held that not ordinary care but a high degree of
diligence is required of one conducting blasting operations. 2s How-
(c) (1953), concerning the sale ana storage of explosives, provides: "All
persons having dynamite or other powerful explosives in their possession or
under their control shall at all times keep such explosives in a safe and
secure manner . . . ." Quaere whether this language points to any basis of
liability for damage caused by blasting?
2E.g., Hunter v. Southern Ry., 152 N.C. 682, 68 S.E. 237 (1910);
Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399, 55 S.E. 778 (1906).
Ii Settle v. Southern Ry., 150 N.C. 643, 64 S.E. 759 (1909).However, in a federal case arising in North Carolina involving injury
to plaintiff's railroad bed by rock and debris, it was held that: "There can
be no doubt.. that where one ... throws rock or debris on the property of
another, he is liable for the damage done, on the principle that he is guilty
of trespass, and quite irrespective of the question of his negligence." Ashe-
ville Constr. Co. v. Southern Ry., 19 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1927).
" The court has, however, expressed doubt as to whether proof of negli-
gence is necessary. Wiggins v. Hiawassee Valley Ry., 171 N.C. 773, 775,
89 S.E. 18, 19 (1916): "We are of opinion that there is abundant proof of
negligence (even if proof of negligence be necessary where such a trespass
is committed upon the property and rights of another) to justify the submis-
sion of the issues to the jury"; Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393, 402, 73 S.E.
206, 210 (1911): "The plaintiff was entitled to recover damages, if the
defendant threw stones upon his land without his consent, and if he consented
to the use of the quarry [operated on defendant's adjoining tract], he could
also recover if the work was negligently done."
" Greer v. Callahan Constr. Co., 190 N.C. 632, 130 S.E. 737 (1925);
Hunter v. Southern Ry., 152 N.C. 682, 68 S.E. 237 (1910).
"'Arthur v. Henry, 157 N.C. 393, 73 S.E. 206 (1911).
8 Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906). Other cases,
not directly involving blasting but concerning the use of explosives in general,
have stated the standard to be the highest or utmost care. Stephens v.
Blackwood Lumber Co., 191 N.C. 23, 131 S.E. 314 (1926) ; Barnett v. Cliff-
side Mills, 167 N.C. 576, 83 S.E. 826 (1914); Wood v. McCabe & Co., 151
N.C. 457, 66 S.E. 433 (1909). See Note, 39 N.C.L. REv. 294 (1961), which
submits that there is only one standard of care and no degrees thereof.
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ever, if the rule should emerge that proof of negligence is the pref-
erable theory, it seems feasible that the plaintiff injured by blasting
should be afforded the benefit of the rule of res ipsa loquitur.2' Our
court has invoked the rule in cases involving explosions other than
by blasting, 0 and there is substantial authority supporting its appli-
cation in concussion-vibration cases in other jurisdictions.
3 1
Should North Carolina adopt the rule of absolute liability, it can
fairly be predicted that the rule will not be reached through the
avenue of ancient reasoning derived from the common law action of
trespass quare clausum fregit that trespass to land subjects the de-
fendant to liability regardless of fault. This is so not only because
North Carolina in the past has proceeded on the theory of negligence
rather than trespass even in cases of rock-debris invasion, but also
because recent decisions indicate that this timeworn proposition is
no longer the law in this jurisdiction. 2  In a very real sense, the
" "When the thing [which causes injury] is shown to be under the
management of the defendant ... and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care." Scott v. Lon-
don & St. Katherine Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596, 601, 159 Eng. Rep. 665, 667
(Ex. 1865), quotdd with' appfoval in Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235, 238,
111 S.E. 177, 178 (1922).
" Howard v. Texas Co., 205 N.C. 20, 168 S.E. 832 (1933) (filling sta-
tion); Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235, 111 S.E. 177 (1922) (boiler);
Modlin v. Simmons, 183 N.C. 63, 110 S.E. 661 (1922) (automobile); Newton
v. Texas Co., 180 N.C. 561, 105 S.E. 433 (1920) (gasoline storage plant).
" Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc., 154 A.2d 565 (Del. Super. Ct.
1959) ; Marlowe Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 302 S.W.2d 612 (Ky. Ct. App. 1957) ;
Hoyt v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 69 So. 2d 546 (La. Ct. App. 1953);
Cratty v. Samuel Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 116 A.2d 623 (1955); McKay
v. Kelly, 229 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
" For the modem proposition that strict liability for trespass to land de-
rived from the common law action of trespass quare clawmum fregit is out-
moded and that proof of negligence should be required where defendant's act
is unintentional, see PROSSER, TORTS § 13 (2d ed. 1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 166 (1938). This seems to be the law in North Carolina. In Newsom v.
Anderson, 24 N.C. 42 (1841), action in trespass quare clausum fregit was
held proper where defendant felled a tree, the top thereof falling on plain-
tiff's land; trespass vi et armis was held applicable where defendant, who was
beating a drum in the highway, caused plaintiff's team to run away. Loubz
v. Hafner, 12 N.C. 185 (1827). But see a later case denying recovery where
defendant's automobile left the road and crashed into plaintiff's building.
Finding the accident unavoidable, the court cited both of the above cases,
saying: "Neither shows unavoidable accident or sudden emergency but dam-
age resulting from iiegligence. It must also be remembered that forms of
action have been abolished . . . ." Smith v. Pate, 246 N.C. 63, 66, 97
S.E.2d 457, 459 (1957). (Emphasis added.) For a recent case to the same
effect on substantially the same facts, see Schloss v. Hallman, 255 N.C. 686,
122 S.E.2d 513 (1961), discussed in 40 N.C.L. REv. 586 (1962).
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past and present state of the law prevents North Carolina from
reaching the somewhat embarrassing position of the minority rule
of applying two rules in the same jurisdiction through an adherence
to common law reasoning, i.e., that unlike rock and debris, con-
cussion waves and earth vibrations are not direct applications of
force constituting trespass to land.
A quick reading of the decisions imposing absolute liability for
concussion and vibration damage could possibly lead to the conclu-
sion that the rule is based upon an extension of the common law
theory of strict liability for trespass to land, i.e., that air waves
and ground vibrations are physical invasions equivalent to rock* and
debris ;33 and that, therefore, the door is closed to the'adoption of
the rule in North Carolina. A careful investigation of the cases,
however, reveals that absolute liability is really a rule founded upon
public policy which could easily be adopted by our court3 4 upon the
reasoning that the extrahazardous nature of blasting demands that
the defendant stand as an insurer of the possibility of injury, which,
in many instances, cannot be eliminated by the greatest of care.3 5
JOHN BRYAN WHITLEY
Torts-Family Purpose Doctrine-Application to Other
Instrumentalities
The family purpose doctrine has been applied by a minority of
jurisdictions in cases involving the negligent operation of automo-
biles furnished for the use and enjoyment of the family.' Grindstaff
"E.g., Beckstrom v. Hawaiian Dredging Co., 42 Hawaii 353 (1958);
Wallace v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960) ; Brown
v. L. S. Lunder Constr. Co., 240 Wis. 122, 2 N.W.2d 859 (1942).
" Recently the North Carolina Supreme Court quoted and applied RE-
STATEMENT, TORTs § 166 (1938), which provides: "Except where the actor
is engaged in an extrahazardous activity, an unintentional and non-negligent
entry on land in the possession of another or causing a thing or third person
to enter the land, does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor, even
though the entry causes harm to the possessor or to a thing or third person
in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest." Schloss v.
Hallman, 255 N.C. 686, 691, 122 S.E.2d 513, 517 (1961). Quaere whether
the court will apply this rule to a non-negligent and unintentional explosion
and hold absolute liability?
"E.g., Fairfax Inn, Inc. v. Sunnyhill Mining Co., 97 F. Supp. 991 (N.D.
W. Va. 1951); Britton v. Harrison Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.
W. Va. 1948); Whitman Hotel Corp. v. Elliott & Watrous Eng'r Co., 137
Conn. 562, 79 A.2d 591 (1951).
'E.g., Durso v. A. D. Cozzolino, Inc., 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392 (1942);
Wells v. Lockhart, 258 Ky. 698, 81 S.W.2d 5 (1935); Linch v. Dobson, 108
Neb. 632, 188 N.W. 227 (1922).
1962]
